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Abstract
Background: In quasi-markets governance over healthcare providers is mediated by commissioners. Different
commissioners apply different combinations of six methods of control (’media of power’) for exercising
governance: managerial performance, negotiation, discursive control, incentives, competition and juridical control.
This paper compares how English and German healthcare commissioners do so.
Methods: Systematic comparison of observational national-level case studies in terms of six media of power, using
data from multiple sources.
Results: The comparison exposes and contrasts two basic generic modes of commissioning:
1. Surrogate planning (English NHS), in which a negotiated order involving micro-commissioning, provider
competition, financial incentives and penalties are the dominant media of commissioner power over providers.
2. Case-mix commissioning (Germany), in which managerial performance, an ‘episode based’ negotiated order and
juridical controls appear the dominant media of commissioner power.
Conclusions: Governments do not necessarily maximise commissioners’ power over providers by implementing as
many media of power as possible because these media interact, some complementing and others inhibiting each
other. In particular, patient choice of provider inhibits commissioners’ use of provider competition as a means of
control.
Health care commissioning as governance
How can commissioning be used for exercising govern-
ance over health-care providers in a quasi-market? To
answer this question we compare the commissioning
which has emerged from recent market-based reforms
in England and Germany, analysing it in terms of the
means that commissioners have for exercising power
over providers. For England and Germany are arche-
types of the Beveridge and the Bismarck systems of
commissioning respectively, particularly for hospital ser-
vices. Several other health systems structurally resemble
the NHS (e.g. in Scandinavia) or are modelled on it (e.g.
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Australia, New Zealand). The
same applies to the German social health insurance
(SHI) system of commissioning (e.g. France, Nether-
lands, Belgium, Switzerland, Russia).
Health policy contexts
Most governments wish to maintain health care provi-
ders’ accountability to the state. The ‘bed-pan doctrine’
often attributed [1] to Aneurin Bevan is a celebrated
statement of this:
’if a bedpan is dropped in any hospital corridor, the
noise should reverberate through the corridors of
Whitehall’ (p.103).
In quasi-markets, commissioners mediate the account-
ability chains [2] between government and providers. By
‘commissioners’ we mean organisations that select and/
or finance other individuals and organisations to pro-
vide healthcare – whether social health insurers (e.g.
* Correspondence: R.Sheaff@plymouth.ac.uk
1University of Plymouth, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Sheaff et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13(Suppl 1):S8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/S1/S8
© 2013 Sheaff et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Krankenkassen (Germany), Siekenfonds (Netherlands)),
state bodies (e.g. Medicare (USA), National Commis-
sioning Board (England)), groups of primary care doc-
tors (e.g. Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs:
England)), corporate insurers, charities or mutuals (e.g.
Group Health (USA)). Many commissioners also, even
mainly, act as the agents of employers, subscribers,
shareholders and other interests.
Hitherto, NHS commissioning in England was con-
ducted mainly by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), centrally
funded from taxation. For whole populations, typically of
about 500,000, PCTs purchased hospital, community
health and some primary medical care services by con-
tracting a mixture of providers, some private but still
mostly NHS-owned. A bare majority of general practices
are commissioned through a national General Medical
Services (GMS) contract whose implementation and pay-
ment PCTs monitor. PCTs are now being replaced by
CCGs, membership organisations which are local net-
works of general practices. In many respects CCGs
extend and develop the 1991 GP Fund-Holding scheme,
for general practices will hold the budgets for their
patients’ non-GP primary care and most secondary care
(see [3]). Access to non-emergency hospital care (which
in England includes specialist ambulatory care) is solely
by GP referral.
In Germany the main healthcare commissioners are
SHIs (’sick-funds’, Krankenkassen) and Land (provincial)
governments. 87% of the population are SHI members
(2012), the remainder privately insured or self-payers.
Since 2007 the SHIs have competed for subscribers. Land
governments plan the allocation of hospital beds and
largely finance the corresponding infrastructure. Primary
care doctors are commissioned by dividing a cash limited
budget according to the points that each doctor has
earned, with different numbers of points for different med-
ical acts. Patients can self-refer to any ‘ambulatory’ doctor
i.e. generalist family doctor or non-hospital specialist.
Germany has long had a mixture of public (49% of beds in
2008), corporate (15%) and charitable (36%) hospitals.
Both Germany and England have introduced DRG-
based systems (D-DRGs in Germany, HRGs or ‘payment
by results’ in England) as the main method for hospital
payment. The UK government is continues to promote
corporate and third-sector provision of NHS-funded
care; in 2008-9 only 7.1% of budgets was spent on non-
NHS providers (general practices apart). Some English
policy-makers hope that CCGs will compete for patients,
but that has been a marginal theme in NHS reforms.
Media of power
Commissioners generally try to control healthcare provi-
ders by using a combination of several methods in parallel
[4]. We call each method of control a ‘medium of power’,
because each embodies what Foucault [5] called a ‘tech-
nology of power’. (He called a specific combination of
methods a ‘dispositif’.) Such combinations cannot be char-
acterised a priori, only identified empirically [6]. Global
overviews (e.g. [7,8]) suggest that healthcare commis-
sioners generally use one or more of the following media
of power.
Managerial performance of commissioning
In any quasi-market the managerial performance of
commissioning consists essentially of:
1. Proposing contracts to potential providers and,
where permitted, selecting providers.
2. Contract negotiation (see below)
3. Auditing and monitoring provider performance.
Transparency of provider activities and costs greatly
assists commissioners in these activities [7].
Negotiated order
A negotiated order is an explicitly or tacitly agreed division
of labour and concomitant rights of non-interference [9]
between (here) commissioners and providers. Commis-
sioners influence providers by influencing who participates
in the negotiations, what topics are negotiable, and when
they will be re-negotiated. The conduct and results of the
negotiations depend partly upon the degree of trust
between commissioners and providers i.e. whether the
negotiators have similar or divergent interests, which in
turn reflects the organisational aims, hence ownership and
accountabilities, on either side. Where trust is strong a
negotiated order centres upon discursive control (see
below). The latter can still be applied even where trust is
weak or absent, but then negotiators rely more on non-
discursive mechanisms to align provider with commis-
sioner interests artificially, including psychological pressure
such as bullying in negotiations.
Discursive control
Commissioners have two discursive resources for persuad-
ing providers to comply with commissioner aims. Etic dis-
course (evidential, technical or scientific knowledge)
nowadays means above all evidence based medicine
(EBM) and epidemiology. As for emic discourse, i.e. dis-
course that is intelligible and morally persuasive to those
who inhabit a particular culture but not necessarily to
others, professions have what Foucault [5] called their ‘dis-
cipline’, supplementing technical knowledge with norms
of conduct towards peers, superiors, clients and others;
and wider ideologies (religion, economics etc.) [10]. The
more that providers and commissioners speak the same
discourses, the more persuasive one would expect a com-
missioner’s arguments to be to a provider.
Financial incentives
For commissioners, the incentive effects of financial pay-
ments and penalties upon providers depends on:
1. how resource-dependent the provider is upon the
commissioner
Sheaff et al. BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13(Suppl 1):S8
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/13/S1/S8
Page 2 of 10
2. how much discretion the commissioner has to decide
what services to finance, what unit of payment (per case,
per diem etc.) the incentive or penalty attaches to [7], and
to vary the payments or penalties accordingly.
These factors are not necessarily under the commis-
sioners’ or even providers’ control. Commissioners in
some health systems are restricted to reimbursing provi-
ders chosen by patients or GP gatekeepers. Then commis-
sioners can only influence provider selection indirectly by
framing (’nudging’) the patients’ or gatekeepers’ choices
[11].
Provider competition
Competition accentuates providers’ resource-dependence.
Commissioners’ bargaining power depends on the number
of organisations on either side of the market, with mono-
poly and monopsony as polar cases. Commissioners can
strengthen their position by inviting new bidders, helping
establish new providers, or providing services themselves
(’make or buy’ decisions). A commissioner facing a mono-
poly provider may nevertheless be able to use provider
contestability – the credible threat of seeking or creating
an alternative provider – to influence the provider [12].
Commissioners can also define the locus of competition
i.e. criteria by which to select providers; at crudest, price
versus non-price (’quality’) competition.
Juridical governance
The legal system gives commissioners two control
mechanisms over providers. One is how contract terms
are specified, although there are always practical limits to
contract completeness and presentiation [13]. The other is
appeal to any regulative authorities (including those who
license providers), special administrative courts (where
they exist), the ordinary courts, or (in some systems) to
higher governmental authority. Provider licensing and reg-
ulation are not usually commissioner prerogatives.
As noted, commissioners try to exercise governance
over providers through particular combinations of the
above media of power. We call each such combination a
‘mode of commissioning’. Because its component media
of power interact, each medium of power might be
expected to have different effects even on similar provi-
ders (e.g. university hospitals) according to the institu-
tional context in which it is applied. The structure of
each quasi-market constrains which mode(s) of commis-
sioning are available to commissioners within it. Hence
market-based healthcare ‘reforms’ alter commissioners’,
and at one remove governments’, capacity for governance
over healthcare providers. The resulting differences in
modes of commissioning therefore help explain among
other things a health quasi-market’s:
1. Patterns of provider development, including spread
of medical technologies, the absence of specific kinds of
provider or services, patterns of corporatisation and
concentration of capital.
2. Capacity for cost control.
3. Patterns of managerial development of commission-
ing and medical involvement in it.
4. Development and use of evidence-based medicine.
This paper therefore examines how current post-
reform modes of commissioning differ between the Ger-
man and English health systems, and the implications
for market-based ‘reforms’.
Methods
We systematically compared two national case studies
(England, Germany) of current commissioning practice.
Data were collected at national, commissioner and
provider level in Germany and England, 2011-12, by
mixed methods from the following sources:
1. Interviews and discussions with key informants. In
Germany these were representatives of the three the
main federal associations of health organisations and the
Federal Joint Committee (Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss
(GB-A); 11 staff, covering a range of functions, one of
the largest national SHIs; and managers from five hospi-
tals (university, third-sector and publicly-owned).
English interviewees, over 80 in all, came from PCTs,
CCGs, Commissioning Support Groups, NHS hospitals
and general practices.
2. Grey material including official regulations and gui-
dance, for Germany, Sozialgesetzbuch V (SGB5) above
all and for England the white paper [14] stating the
rationale of the current commissioning system. .
3. Participation in three national events involving
German SHIs.
4. Ad hoc enquiries from individual experts.
5. Published research found by hand-searching
journals.
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Material in
German was translated either by two of the researchers
or by native German speakers taking PhDs in England.
The greater quantity of data collected in England
reflects greater data collection there about differences in
commissioning for different care-groups.
For systematic comparison the data were collated into
an analytic framework structured according to the above
media of power. Collating data from multiple sources
provided an immediate means of triangulation, revealing
gaps, ambiguities or apparent contradictions in the data,
prompting supplementary data collection. The concept
of power implies a counter-factual account of what provi-
ders would otherwise do [15] if commissioners were less
powerful (and vice-versa), which we obtained empirically
from informants’ accounts of commissioners’ attempts to
change provider practice, of providers’ response(s), and
of what happened when providers proposed changes that
the commissioners contested. We abstracted from the
empirical comparison a characterisation of different
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generic modes of commissioning. Those differences and
similarities which reflect the differences and similarities
in quasi-market structures between the two countries are
also likely to be relevant to other structurally similar
quasi-markets. By comparing these generic modes of
commissioning we drew some implications for health
system reform policy, and corrected and refined our
initial concepts of ‘medium of power’ and ‘mode of com-
missioning’ .
SW2 Research Ethics Committee gave ethical approval




To launch the annual contract negotiations, German
SHIs send each hospital spreadsheets of DRG targets.
The proposed case-mix implies an overall number of
DRG points, hence an implied budget. It is possible to
reduce, even remove, groups of cases by reallocation
within the total number of points but the system does
not readily allow an overall reduction in case-load, case-
mix or budget. National SHI federations, SHI national
offices and local health-manager networks advise and
update SHI negotiators about the current commissioning
climate and local issues, but the hospitals have better
data about their own case-mix and internal costs than
the SHIs do. Continuously the SHIs audit, confirm and
make payments, collecting from hospital bills and medi-
cal records data about what activity is being paid for. A
Medical Review Board decides unclear or disputed cases;
hospital staff tend to dislike its members.
English commissioners attempt to plan and finance all
NHS service provision for a geographical population.
Case-mix modelling is relevant to this activity but NHS
commissioners usually predict demand en bloc on an his-
torical basis, then decide how to finance new services and/
or reallocate workload between providers. For small care-
groups, commissioners often ally with other nearby com-
missioners to achieve managerial economies of scale and
greater bargaining power when negotiating with specia-
lised providers but, especially in larger cities, several NHS
commissioners at times negotiate separately with one pro-
vider. An important difference is that NHS commissioning
budgets are cash-limited but German SHIs can attempt to
recruit more subscribers through marketing and offering
more or better subscriber services (e.g. health promotion,
information about available providers). In reality patient
participation and marketing activities are marginal, if well-
regarded, activities for NHS commissioners.
Provider transparency
The aforementioned activities give German SHIs strong
information management systems. One SHI, reputedly
the most developed in this respect, could routinely
make such analyses as volumes of hip replacement revi-
sions per provider and evaluation of disease manage-
ment programme costs and outcomes for diabetes. SHIs
compare their own data for hospital case-mix with the
publicly available figures for all Germany, interrogating
apparent inconsistencies between the two. Although,
judging by what is publicly available, the range of
nationally collected NHS data has increased substantially
in the last three years, few NHS commissioners seem
able to make similar analyses. The larger SHIs have
economists, legal and other experts to advise (but not
join) their local negotiating teams, in that way resem-
bling Commissioning Support organisations in the NHS.
Nevertheless hospital activity is far from transparent
to German SHIs. German hospital managers told us
that when negotiating with commissioners they aggre-
gated data and income data into large blocks:
I: ’Why did you decide [to do] that?’
Controllingschef: ‘[So that we need only] To make in
all one negotiation about the DRGs and one for nur-
sing care for children. And it’s less transparent to the
SHIs. … We have an orthopaedic department in [hos-
pital 1] and one at [hospital 2], and the SHIs could
see from our data, our Excel tables, we have done
this here but more there … if we handle matters at a
large scale we don’t have to discuss these things with
the SHI’ (Hospital 4).
NHS providers’ counterpart is a ‘commercial - in con-
fidence’ argument for withholding information, although
some PCTs reported an opposite problem, receiving
masses of unanalysed data which left provider activity
equally opaque. However the NHS incentive schemes
(see below) which operate in parallel with HRGs expose
some additional data, besides HRG out-turns, about
hospitals’ clinical work. Providers manipulating and mis-
representing activity data has become a problem in the




In Germany, annual negotiations involving all main inter-
est-groups (Federal associations of SHIs, doctors and
dentists, hospitals and patient organisations), coordinated
by the Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss and with the state
as arbiter, set the broad framework of health service plan-
ning, including numerous guidelines for quality of care.
(This ‘Rhine’ or ‘Ordoliberal’ approach is deeply rooted
in German political culture [16]). They approve new
treatments and diagnostic procedures for SHI reimburse-
ment, the relative weights for the DRGs and how many
points ambulatory care doctors are credited for each type
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of medical act. Although binding, these decisions are
consensual. Consequently the doctors and SHIs have
been able to block certain changes. For instance the
Association of Ambulatory Physicians vetoed other doc-
tors doing out-of-hospital surgical procedures [17]. The
Euro value of the budget for dentists and ambulatory
care doctors is negotiated between the Land doctors’
chamber and the Land government, then at year end allo-
cated retrospectively according to how many points each
clinician earned. The Land can adjust the price of specific
medical acts but not control the number or composition
of ambulatory care providers. Similar negotiations estab-
lish a Land bed-plan based on predicted needs for hospi-
tal services. It frames the ensuing commissioner-provider
negotiations by defining the each hospital’s bed numbers,
overall case-load, case-mix and, in effect, ceiling for
SHI-funded activity. These negotiations focus on the hos-
pital’s DRG points allocation, case mix and the nation-
ally-defined growth margin rather than clinical quality.
The parties negotiate a ‘corridor’ for the main groups of
DRGs, what rebates the SHI will receive should the
volume or case-mix fall below that range and the pay-
ment for justified additional work above it. Generally the
SHIs wish to avoid patient numbers, hence costs, spiral-
ling out of control. Payment for new treatments not yet
in the DRG system and for discretionary services are also
negotiated.
Whilst the terms of GP contracts are negotiated
nationally, the key negotiated order in the English NHS
is established as each commissioner attempts to induce
each of its providers to accept and implement the com-
missioner’s plans for that provider’s services; essentially
a principal-agent negotiation [18]. It is typically – but
not always – a bilateral negotiation with some flexibility
as to when it occurs and what topics are negotiated.
However, commissioners’ agenda strongly reflects
national policies, targets, priorities and guidelines.
Hence the range of topics is typically wider and less pre-
cisely formulated than DRG-based allocations and per-
formance measures alone. For service quality, the Care
Quality and Innovation programme (CQUIN) now sets
a range of specific targets, but depending on circum-
stances NICE or other guidelines can also be involved.
(CQUIN sets quality standards which apply to all NHS
hospitals. There are financial incentives for achieving
them, and penalties for non-compliance.) The negotia-
tions are framed by an annual contracting cycle
although in practice non-marginal negotiations with a
given provider may take place only every two or three
years so as to reduce the managerial workload.
Episode-based versus micro commissioning
The main currencies of commissioning negotiations in
Germany are for hospitals the number and case-mix of
episodes and for ambulatory care doctors, medical acts.
More than in Germany, NHS commissioners’ negotia-
tions with hospitals, community health services and
mental health services also concern the processes of
care, clinical quality of care, and the care pathways used,
especially for types of care which are distributed over
several separate providers (see [17,18]) and whose qual-
ity is hard to measure. NHS commissioners generally
commission either a ‘lead provider’ to coordinate the
others, or case managers. Either way the negotiated
order (also) establishes arrangements for inter-provider
coordination. This ‘micro-commissioning’ (as English
GPs call it) contrasts with the focus on episodes of care
in negotiations between SHIs and German providers;
and indeed NHS commissioners’ negotiations with cor-
porate treatment centres. ‘Relational contracting’ in the
NHS, at times almost adversarial, includes the informal
exchange of information and the negotiation of adjust-
ments to services and costs in between re-negotiations
of a whole contract (see [13]).
Discursive control
Emic discourse: solidarity versus authority
Informants in both countries mentioned emic discourses
used in commissioning management and negotiations.
German informants tended to refer to nationally nego-
tiated agreements, themselves reflecting the ‘solidaristic’
Rhineland approach to policy formation mentioned
above. In negotiations, they said, the regulations and dif-
ferent parties’ rights and obligations regarding health-
care were often cited but these arguments could work
both ways. When SHIs claim to represent patients’
interests, the hospitals can reply that they – and SHIs –
are equally obliged to ensure that patients can get the
services that they (patients) choose. Apart from having
to work within the Land bed-plan, considerations of
public accountability did not appear to figure much.
Despite recent attempts to dilute it the English ‘bed
pan doctrine’ remains strong. English law gives the
Secretary of State for Health wide discretion, largely
delegated to NHS commissioners who often justify par-
ticular commissioning proposals and decisions as being
or implementing ‘policy’, ultimately the government’s
will. The politicisation and central control of NHS
healthcare, through target-based performance manage-
ment, is much more pronounced than in Germany. Our
English informants at times also used new public man-
agement discourse, especially variants which represent
markets and corporations as desirable models.
Evidential discourse
English informants made more frequent references to
the use of EBM as a means of persuasion in commis-
sioning negotiations than their German counterparts.
Health technology assessments and NICE guidance play
an increasing role in legitimating commissioning
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decisions in the NHS and in making clinical practice
more transparent to non-medical managers. Provided
they stick to treatments authorised under the Land plan
and obey the law and regulations, German providers’
treatment methods are beyond SHI scrutiny. The Medi-
zinische Dienst der Krankenkassen (MDK) reviews
patient case-notes in order to verify whether the coding
and therefore payment were appropriate given the clini-
cal facts, not to review effectiveness of care. In Germany
the place of EBM is more at national level. When the
GB-A decides which new therapies, devices, pharmaceu-
ticals or models of care to include in the DRG tariff,
they use above all evidence about effectiveness from the
Institut für Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit in Gesund-
heitswesen (IQWiG). To recruit members, some SHIs
pay for still-experimental treatments that they expect
the D-DRG tariffs will eventually include, and for some
complementary treatments having little evidence of effi-
cacy. In contrast English PCTs and CCGs tightly control
requests for such treatments, for example though special
prioritisation committees.
Incentives: pay for performance versus reimbursement
Both systems use pay-for-performance and reimburse-
ment payments, but the NHS much more than the Ger-
man system supplements tariff payments with pay for
performance.
German commissioners mainly, and NHS commis-
sioners partly, have to use predefined incentives which
leave little local discretion for using financial incentives to
reward providers for improving the clinical quality of care.
In both systems, DRG-based payments give hospitals a
financial incentive to increase activity. In Germany, only a
few treatments (e.g. short-term nursing care at home)
require prior SHI consent to pay. Since 1998 German
SHIs have offered selective contracts, restricting subscri-
bers’ choice of providers in return for lower subscriptions.
Patients must opt into these and into integrated care pro-
grammes, but many patients assume that only providers
which have difficulty attracting patients will accept such
contracts. For chronic care, the SHIs pay a per-diem Pfle-
gekost and will from 2013 have the option to do the same
(instead of making cost-plus payments) for psychiatric ser-
vices. However the points tariff for ambulatory care has
been modified to accommodate disease management pro-
grammes, i.e. preventive case management and continuous
care for certain chronic conditions (e.g. diabetes, COPD).
Some 14,000 such schemes exist but only about 5.5% of
people are enrolled in them. The benefits appear to be
improved care, at least for diabetics [21], rather than cost
savings. Some experimental integrated care projects con-
struct inter-organisational care pathways linking primary
and secondary providers for certain patient groups, but
they also require specially-negotiated contracts because
DRGs aren’t available for network-based care provision.
Integrated care and disease management programmes
represent only 1% of healthcare spending. Mostly, SHIs
have to reimburse post facto whichever provider a patient
chooses.
Within the GMS contract, NHS commissioners also
have little discretion in setting financial incentives for
general practices. The GMS contract predefines capita-
tion and Quality and Outcome Framework (QOF) pay-
ments for service quality, the latter being arguably the
most developed pay-for-performance incentive system in
the healthcare world. Personal Medical Services (PMS)
and Alternative Provider Medical Service (APMS) con-
tracts are more flexible [22] if more laborious to man-
age. Nevertheless they do permit NHS commissioners to
vary the financial incentives facing primary care provi-
ders and at times to reduce payments to them (more
often for cost-saving than incentive reasons). NHS com-
missioners can also make ad hoc discretionary payments
to general practices, for instance for additional services
such as clinics for refugees. CCGs have inherited this
mixture of incentive options, although recent press
reports speculate that the different primary care contract
types may soon be synthesised into a single format.
For hospitals, NHS commissioners supplement DRG-
like payments with pay-for-performance incentives,
often closely linked with policy imperatives. CQUIN
incentives cut across specialties and are used to incenti-
vise attempts to improve aspects of the quality of care
(e.g. preventing hospital-acquired infection) which are
not specific to one DRG. Commissioners of community
health services have essentially the same range of incen-
tives at their disposal. However, the NHS is now extend-
ing DRG-like payments to long-term (e.g. mental health)
and end-of-life care, reducing commissioner latitude to
determine incentives in these areas.
Competition: any permitted provider
NHS commissioners can chose their providers. Except
for selective and integrated care contracts, German com-
missioners cannot. Only the Land government can select
or deselect hospitals as providers to be included in its
bed-plan. For ambulatory care doctors and dentists, not
even this mechanism is available. Any provider permitted
under the plan and regulations is entitled to payment for
whatever SHI-insured patients it can attract. Regulations
intended to maximise provider diversity and competition
for patients thus remove provider competition as a med-
ium of power for the commissioners. The recently-
announced UK policy of allowing ‘any qualified provider’
to treat NHS patients appears similar, although it
remains to be seen whether NHS commissioners will
have to pay such providers even in the absence of any
prior contract with them.
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Although the English GMS contract for general prac-
tices is negotiated at national level, CCGs can still prevent
new general practices entering ‘over-doctored areas’ and
use discretionary payments and APMS contracts to attract
new primary care providers into under-doctored areas. A
minority of primary care providers are now private firms
working APMS contracts. The range of other primary care
provision has widened considerably since 1998 to include
community matrons (providing case-management for peo-
ple with long-term conditions), GPs with special interests,
walk-in centres, corporate general practices, nurse-led
practices, hospital-based GPs and others. Wide though it
is compared with German SHIs, NHS commissioners still
do not use their discretion to select providers as much as
English policy makers would like. Indeed when NHS com-
missioners appeared unwilling to engage corporate ‘inde-
pendent sector treatment centres’ (now re-named ‘NHS
Treatment Centres’), the Department of Health commis-
sioned them itself, with local commissioning bodies only
subsequently implementing and monitoring the contracts
[23]. Meantime the NHS has also introduced a policy of
patient choice of hospital.
NHS hospitals were long constructed on a principle of
one large hospital per district. NHS commissioners buy
a mean of 66% of their secondary care from one hospital
and another 22% from the next largest two. Hospital
competition is limited, in practice, mainly to footloose
services such as planned non-complex surgery. Ger-
many, at least in the west, has a long tradition of multi-
ple, diversely-owned hospitals in each locality. A great
inhibitor of competition between English hospitals
appears to be lack of hospital capacity compared with
Germany, which in 2010 had 5.66 acute beds per 1000
population versus 2.37 in the UK ( <http://stats.oecd.
org/index.aspx> accessed 17 Sept. 2012). This difference
also results in German healthcare being less oriented
towards primary medical care and community health
services than the English NHS. As one SHI interviewee
put it, ‘we have a hospital on every hill’.
Juridical: administrative law versus half-written
constitution
Much more than the NHS, German commissioning relies
on nationally-standardised regulations, contracts and legal
entitlements, clearly-specified decision-making processes
and participants in them, and allocations of decision-mak-
ing powers among particular institutions. The range and
number of services offered, and remuneration rates, are
stipulated at national level for all SHIs [24]. Until recently
this system was used more to define specific entitlements
and prohibitions to services and payments than to manage
healthcare provision directly. German SHIs’ obligations to
patients are legally prescribed. They include a right to
treatment by the patient’s provider of choice (provided
that the provider is eligible to be reimbursed), with the
few exceptions noted above. In disputed cases a first step
is to seek an independent opinion from MDK about the
medical necessity of the treatment in question, followed
by appeal to the Schiedstelle (administrative court) and
then to the civil courts, but even Schiedstelle cases are
infrequent (maybe one or two a year for the largest hospi-
tals) and expensive (€7000 or more per case). The hospi-
tals win perhaps 80% of these cases. Even in the
juridically-oriented German system judicial remedies are
for commissioners and providers alike instruments of last
resort, used only exceptionally.
In contrast the UK juridical framework leaves the secre-
tary of state considerable discretion, widened by the 2012
Health Act. NHS ‘contracts’ - i.e. agreements between two
or more NHS bodies - are used almost as surrogate service
planning documents. Although there is a standard national
framework, NHS contracts appear less complete (less fully
specified) than their German counterparts. The remaining
NHS block contracts are less complete than ‘payment by
results’ (HRG) specifications. Disputes about NHS con-
tracts are resolved at the secretary of state’s discretion not
through the courts. NHS commissioning managers receive
voluminous central ‘guidance’ but its legal and regulatory
status is uncertain. However NHS commissioners and hos-
pitals both know that Monitor (a national regulatory body)
and regional level NHS bodies often intervene to ‘help’ the
managers of NHS hospitals who fail to meet performance
or budget targets, or whose services attract adverse publi-
city. NHS commissioners’ contracts with non-NHS provi-
ders, including general practices, are more complete and
presentiated. Only between NHS bodies and external pro-
viders – above all general practices – are contracts legally
enforceable. One might therefore say that in a juridical
sense the NHS has only a half-written constitution.
Conclusion: modes of commissioning
This comparison focuses on services, excluding inter-sec-
toral public health, research, training, capital allocation
and, above all, long-term care which in both countries is
mostly financed separately (on England, see [24]). Our
whole-system focus passes over more nuanced differences
in commissioning between different care-groups (e.g. psy-
chiatry versus heart disease) and localities. At the time of
study CCGs were still developing. Many details and practi-
calities of their eventual work are so far unknown. The
same applies to psychiatric commissioning in Germany.
Comparisons with the non-English UK countries might
yield different findings (see [13]). Below we compare just
two main generic modes of commissioning. Others exist.
Nevertheless it is apparent that in both health systems
the commissioners’ managerial, negotiative and persua-
sive work reflects the commissioners’ (differing) scope
for discretion in choosing providers and the forms of
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incentive payments to providers, and behind them differ-
ent regulative frameworks and property-relations in health
care. In these respects the English and German health sys-
tems instantiate more generic modes of commissioning.
Abstracting these generic patterns from the historical par-
ticularities of the two health systems, Table 1 summarises
the similarities and differences between the different
generic modes of commissioning which dominate the two
health systems: case-mix commissioning in Germany, sur-
rogate planning in the English NHS.
Under case-mix commissioning, managerial perfor-
mance, negotiated order and juridical controls appear
the dominant media of power. In surrogate planning, a
different kind of negotiated order, provider competition
and financial incentives and penalties dominate. Even
where the same medium (e.g. negotiated order) is used
in two health systems it may take different forms in
each, depending on what other media of power co-exist
and of course national political cultures.
Briefly returning to the aforementioned differences
between health systems that differences in their modes
of commissioning might help to explain, Table 1 sug-
gests at least the following hypotheses:
1. The combination of a consensual negotiated order at
national level, lack of provider competition (for commis-
sioners’ purposes) and rigid tariffs accommodates a diverse
but arguably more stagnant mix of providers compared
with commissioner selection of providers, flexible incen-
tives and managerial disciplinary control. Björnberg,
Garrofé and Lindblad [26] suggest that commissioning as
surrogate planning, including micro-commissioning,
together produce weaker performance on the Euro Health




2. Regulations and tariffs which guarantee providers
payment for all permitted treatments facilitate the
spread of medical technologies and raise provider
incomes, but thereby raise healthcare costs, compared
with cash-limited commissioner budgets and service
plans.
3. Case-mix management promotes the development
of epidemiological and IT-based patterns of commis-
sioning management. Micro-commissioning and clini-
cian involvement in commissioning together promote
more practitioner-focused and EBM-based patterns.
4. The combination of surrogate planning and micro-
commissioning tends to promote EBM at provider level
more readily than case-mix commissioning does.
Each of these hypotheses raises substantial future
research questions.
Discussion: limits of market-based reforms
Considering each mode of commissioning in the round
with its interactions between the different media of power,
the above comparisons suggest certain limits of market-
based reforms. Provider diversification appears to generate
a similar division of labour in either mode of commission-
ing. State-owned tertiary providers increasingly concen-
trate on high-complexity and hard-to-treat (e.g. multiple)
conditions. The third sector also provides especially for
the latter. Corporate providers specialise in profitable care,
typically high-volume non-urgent acute care but (in Ger-
many) also some more complex, high cost acute care (e.g.
heart surgery). Tariff-based payment of competing provi-
ders appears on German experience to leave provider
working practices less transparent than, say, negotiative
order based on micro-commissioning which appears more
readily to allow commissioners to promote evidence-based
clinical practice and inter-organisational coordination of
complex care.
If ‘any qualified provider’ comes to mean in the NHS
what it does in Germany, it would prevent commis-
sioners using selection (competition) of providers as a
means of controlling them, despite – indeed, because of -
patient choice of provider. Even if commissioners could
use competition as a means of controlling providers, long
term competition involving corporate providers appears,
on German experience, to promote market concentration
(mergers) on the provider side, weakening commis-
sioners’ scope for harnessing provider competition as a
medium of control. Whether the patient or the commis-
sioner chooses providers, only an excess of provision,
Table 1 Contrasting modes of commissioning
Case-mix commissioning Surrogate planning
Managerial
Performance
Case-mix modelling + audit + subscriber marketing. Service planning for geographical population.
Negotiated order Consensus, multi-stakeholder model + episode-
based.
Principal-agent + micro-commissioning
Discursive control Emic solidarity + juridical rights + case-mix data. Emic political authority + EBM
Financial incentives Fixed tariffs. Pay for performance (defined prospectively) + ad hoc + fixed tariffs.
Provider competition None: referral ‘framing’ at most. Competition or bilateral monopoly.
Juridical Comprehensive regulation + administrative law. Unwritten constitution + common law.
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creating the possibility of provider redundancy, results in
providers competing for patients (or, in theory, commis-
sioners). If in pursuit of ‘austerity’ governments constrain
the supply of services they again weaken commissioners’
power to harness competition between providers as a
means of exercising governance over providers. If com-
missioners also cut their discretionary spending, that
weakens or removes certain financial incentives too as
means of controlling providers.
Government attempts to control the health system by
regulation and tariffs (Germany) or by central, politicised
control of commissioning and tariffs (English NHS) push
provider competition into the marginal ‘windows’ [27]
foreclosed by neither regulation, tariff nor policy fiat.
Assuming that some degree of planning of the overall
profile of healthcare provision is desirable, the German
DRG system gives a concrete, detailed way of modelling
and managing hospital activity, case-mix and revenue
costs. It might be argued that deciding DRG volumes
within the constraints of a Land bed-plan puts the infra-
structural cart before the epidemiological horse of health
care needs, whilst the NHS possesses the horse but not
such a good cart. The contrast also suggests that the ben-
efits of DRG-based service planning depend on an exten-
sive IT infrastructure. DRG adoption alone is insufficient.
When providers are entitled to payment once patients
have chosen them, commissioners’ control over provider
costs is weakened from a budgetary cash-limited system
(as NHS) into one which, at most, contains care costs
within ‘corridors’.
So commissioners’ power over providers is not necessa-
rily maximised by creating as many media of power as
possible, for some media frustrate each other. A nego-
tiated order complements juridical (contractual) control
but – especially if it involves micro-commissioning - may
simultaneously compromise competition. Tariff-based
payments are not necessarily easy to reconcile with provi-
der transparency and promoting EBM at provider level.
Patient choice inhibits commissioners’ use of competition
as a means of controlling providers. Quasi-markets
intrinsically separate consumer and payer, raising the
question of whether providers compete for patients (’cash
follows patients’) or for commissioners’ contracts
(patients follow cash). Governments wishing to exercise
power through the medium of commissioners choosing
between competing healthcare providers cannot abdicate
that choice entirely to patients.
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